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Abstract ‘‘All life is problem solving,’’ said Popper. To
deal with arbitrary problems in arbitrary environments, an
ultimate cognitive agent should use its limited hardware in
the ‘‘best’’ and ‘‘most efficient’’ possible way. Can we
formally nail down this informal statement, and derive a
mathematically rigorous blueprint of ultimate cognition?
Yes, we can, using Kurt Go¨del’s celebrated self-reference
trick of 1931 in a new way. Go¨del exhibited the limits of
mathematics and computation by creating a formula that
speaks about itself, claiming to be unprovable by an
algorithmic theorem prover: either the formula is true but
unprovable, or math itself is flawed in an algorithmic sense.
Here we describe an agent-controlling program that speaks
about itself, ready to rewrite itself in arbitrary fashion once
it has found a proof that the rewrite is useful according to a
user-defined utility function. Any such a rewrite is neces-
sarily globally optimal—no local maxima!—since this
proof necessarily must have demonstrated the uselessness
of continuing the proof search for even better rewrites. Our
self-referential program will optimally speed up its proof
searcher and other program parts, but only if the speed up’s
utility is indeed provable—even ultimate cognition has
limits of the Go¨delian kind.
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Introduction and Outline
In the previous millennium Karl Popper already realized that
‘‘all life is problem solving‘‘ [37]. Early work on artificial
general problem solvers [35, 39, 75], however, was heuristic by
nature, without any general proofs of theoretic optimality. More
recent algorithms for problem solving/machine cognition/
reinforcement learning (RL) [24, 73] are also restricted in many
ways, and hardwired: although some of them are designed to
improve some limited type of policy through experience, they
are not self-referential in the sense that they are not part of the
modifiable policy, and cannot improve themselves in a theo-
retically sound way. While recent work on ‘‘consciousness’’
[1, 2, 7, 15, 66, 69] often does address certain aspects of self-
reference, it does not provide an optimal way of using it for the
central issue of problem solving. In general, currently humans
are still needed to create new/better problem solving algorithms
and to prove their usefulness under appropriate assumptions.
Here we will eliminate the restrictive need for human effort
in the most general way possible, leaving all the work
including the proof search to an ultimate self-referential cog-
nitive system that can rewrite and improve itself in arbitrary
computable ways and in a most efficient fashion. To attack this
‘‘Grand Problem of Artificial Intelligence’’ [53], we introduce
a novel class of optimal, fully self-referential [14] general
problem solvers called Go¨del machines [54–58, 60, 62].1 They
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are universal cognitive agents that interact with some (partially
observable) environment and can in principle modify them-
selves without essential limits apart from the limits of
computability. Their initial algorithm is not hardwired; it can
completely rewrite itself, but only if a proof searcher embed-
ded within the initial algorithm can first prove that the rewrite
is useful, given a formalized utility function reflecting com-
putation time and expected future success (e.g., rewards). We
will see that self-rewrites due to this approach are actually
globally optimal (Theorem 4.1, ‘‘Global optimality theorem’’
section), relative to Go¨del’s well-known fundamental restric-
tions of provability [14]. These restrictions should not worry
us; if there is no proof of some self-rewrite’s utility, then
humans cannot do much either.
The initial proof searcher is O()-optimal (has an optimal
order of complexity) in the sense of Theorem 5.1, ‘‘Bias-
optimal proof search’’ section. Unlike hardwired systems
such as Hutter’s [20, 21] and Levin’s [28, 30] (see
‘‘Relations to previous work’’ section), however, a Go¨del
machine can in principle speed up any part of its initial
software, including its proof searcher, to meet arbitrary
formalizable notions of optimality beyond those express-
ible in the O()-notation. Our approach yields the first
theoretically sound, fully self-referential, optimal, general
problem solvers—the ultimate cognitive agents.
Outline The following section presents basic concepts
and fundamental limitations, the essential details of a self-
referential axiomatic system are shown in the section
‘‘Essential details of one representative Go¨del machine’’,
followed by the section ‘‘Global Optimality Theorem’’, and
the O()-optimal (Theorem 5.1) initial proof searcher is
explained in the section ‘‘Bias-optimal proof searcher’’.
The section ‘‘Discussion and previous work’’ provides
examples and relations to previous work, and briefly
discusses issues such as a technical justification of
consciousness.
Overview/Basic Ideas/Limitations
Many traditional problems of computer science require just
one problem-defining input at the beginning of the problem
solving process. For example, the initial input may be a
large integer, and the goal may be to factorize it. In what
follows, however, we will also consider the more general
case where the problem solution requires interaction with a
dynamic, initially unknown environment that produces a
continual stream of inputs and feedback signals, such as in
autonomous robot control tasks, where the goal may be to
maximize expected cumulative future reward of an
embedded agent [24]. This may require the solution of
essentially arbitrary problems (examples in the section
‘‘Example applications’’ formulate traditional problems as
special cases).
Set-up and Formal Goal
Our hardware could be an artificial recurrent neural net-
work (RNN) [65] whose computational power in principle
matches the one of any traditional computer [42, 67], or a
universal or space-bounded Turing machine (TM) [74], or
the abstract model of a personal computer. The hardware
has a single life which consists of discrete cycles or time
steps t ¼ 1; 2; . . .: Its total lifetime T may or may not be
known in advance. In what follows, the value of any time-
varying variable Q at time t will be denoted by Q(t).
During each cycle our hardware executes an elementary
operation which affects its variable state s 2 S  B
(without loss of generality, B is the set of possible bit-
strings over the binary alphabet B ¼ f0; 1gÞ and possibly
also the variable environmental state Env 2 E (here we
need not yet specify the problem-dependent set EÞ: There is
a hardwired state transition function F : S  E ! S: For
t [ 1; sðtÞ ¼ Fðsðt  1Þ; Envðt  1ÞÞ is the state at a point
where the hardware operation of cycle t - 1 is finished, but
the one of t has not started yet. Env(t) may depend on past
output actions encoded in s(t - 1) and is simultaneously
updated or (probabilistically) computed by the possibly
reactive environment.
In order to talk conveniently about programs and data,
we will often attach names to certain string variables
encoded as components or substrings of s. Of particular
interest are the three variables called time, x, y, and p:
1. At time t, variable time holds a unique binary
representation of t. We initialize timeð1Þ ¼ ‘1’, the
bitstring consisting only of a one. The hardware
increments time from one cycle to the next. This
requires at most O(log t) and on average only O(1)
computational steps.
2. Variable x holds the inputs from the environment to the
Go¨del machine. For t [ 1, x(t) may differ from x(t - 1)
only if a program running on the Go¨del machine has
executed a special input-requesting instruction at time
t - 1. In general, the delays between successive inputs
should be sufficiently large so that programs can perform
certain elementary computations on an input, such as
copying it into internal storage (a reserved part of s)
before the next input arrives.
3. Variable y holds the outputs of the Go¨del machine. y(t)
is an output bitstring which may subsequently influ-
ence the environment, where y(1) = ‘00 by default. For
example, y(t) could be interpreted as a control signal
for an environment-manipulating robot whose actions
may have an effect on future inputs.
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4. p(1) is the initial software: a program implementing
the original (sub-optimal) policy for interacting with
the environment, represented as a substring e(1) of
p(1), plus the original policy for searching proofs.
Details will be discussed below.
At any given time tð1 t TÞ the goal is to maximize
future success or utility. A typical ‘‘value to go’’ utility
function is of the form uðs; EnvÞ : S  E ! R; where R is
the set of real numbers:
uðs; EnvÞ ¼ El
XT
s¼time
rðsÞ j s; Env
" #
; ð1Þ
where r(t) is a real-valued reward input (encoded within
s(t)) at time t, Elð j Þ denotes the conditional expectation
operator with respect to some possibly unknown distribu-
tion l from a set M of possible distributions (M reflects
whatever is known about the possibly probabilistic reac-
tions of the environment), and the above-mentioned
time = time(s) is a function of state s which uniquely
identifies the current cycle. Note that we take into account
the possibility of extending the expected lifespan through
appropriate actions.
Alternative formalizable utility functions could favor
improvement of worst case instead of expected future
performance, or higher reward intake per time interval and
so on. Clearly, most classic problems of computer science
can be formulated in this framework—see examples in the
section ‘‘Example applications.’’
Basic Idea of Go¨del Machine
Our machine becomes a self-referential [14] Go¨del
machine by loading it with a particular form of machine-
dependent, self-modifying code p. In the RNN case p may
correspond to an initial neural activation pattern, in the TM
case to a symbol string. The initial code p(1) at time step 1
includes a (typically sub-optimal) problem solving sub-
routine e(1) for interacting with the environment, such as
any traditional RL algorithm [24], and a general proof
searcher subroutine (see ‘‘Bias-optimal proof search’’ sec-
tion) that systematically makes pairs (switchprog, proof)
(variable substrings of s) until it finds a proof of a target
theorem which essentially states:‘the immediate rewrite of
p through current program switchprog on the given
machine implies higher utility than leaving p as is’. Then it
executes switchprog, which may completely rewrite p,
including the proof searcher. The section ‘‘Essential details
of one representative Go¨del machine’’ will explain details
of the necessary initial axiomatic system A encoded in
p(1). Compare Fig. 1.
The Global optimality theorem (Theorem 4.1, ‘‘Glob-
ally optimality theorem’’ section) shows that this
self-improvement strategy is not greedy: since the utility of
‘leaving p as is’ implicitly evaluates all possible alternative
switchprogs which an unmodified p might find later, we
obtain a globally optimal self-change—the current
switchprog represents the best of all possible relevant self-
changes, relative to the given resource limitations and
initial proof search strategy.
Proof Techniques and an O()-Optimal Initial Proof
Searcher
The ‘‘Bias-optimal proof search’’ section will present an
O()-optimal initialization of the proof searcher, that is, one
with an optimal order of complexity (Theorem 5.1). Still,
there will remain a lot of room for self-improvement hid-
den by the O()-notation. The searcher uses an online
extension of Universal Search [28, 30] to systematically
test online proof techniques, which are proof-generating
programs that may read parts of state s (similarly, mathe-
maticians are often more interested in proof techniques
than in theorems). In order to prove target theorems as
above, proof techniques may invoke special instructions for
generating axioms and applying inference rules to prolong
the current proof by theorems. Here an axiomatic system A
encoded in p(1) includes axioms describing (a) how any
instruction invoked by a program running on the given
hardware will change the machine’s state s (including
instruction pointers, etc.) from one step to the next (such
that proof techniques can reason about the effects of any
program including the proof searcher), (b) the initial
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Fig. 1 Storage snapshot of a not yet self-improved example Go¨del
machine, with the initial software still intact. See text for details
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program p(1) itself (section ‘‘Essential details of one rep-
resentative Go¨del machine’’ will show that this is possible
without introducing circularity), (c) stochastic environ-
mental properties, (d) the formal utility function u, e.g.,
Eq.1, which takes into account computational costs of all
actions including proof search.
Limitations of Go¨del Machines
The fundamental limitations are closely related to those
first identified by Go¨del’s celebrated paper on self-refer-
ential formulae [14]. Any formal system that encompasses
arithmetics (or ZFC, etc.) is either flawed or allows for
unprovable but true statements. Hence, even a Go¨del
machine with unlimited computational resources must
ignore those self-improvements whose effectiveness it
cannot prove, e.g., for lack of sufficiently powerful axioms
in A: In particular, one can construct pathological exam-
ples of environments and utility functions that make it
impossible for the machine to ever prove a target theorem.
Compare Rice’s theorem [38] or Blum’s speed-up theorem
[5, 6] based on certain incomputable predicates. Similarly,
a realistic Go¨del machine with limited resources cannot
profit from self-improvements whose usefulness it cannot
prove within its time and space constraints.
Nevertheless, unlike previous methods, it can in prin-
ciple exploit at least the provably good speed-ups of any
part of its initial software, including those parts responsible
for huge (but problem class-independent) slowdowns
ignored by the earlier approaches [20, 21] (see section
‘‘Possible types of Go¨del machine self-improvements’’).
Essential Details of One Representative Go¨del Machine
Notation. Unless stated otherwise or obvious, throughout
the article newly introduced variables and functions are
assumed to cover the range implicit in the context. l(q)
denotes the number of bits in a bitstring q; qn the nth bit of
q; k the empty string (where lðkÞ ¼ 0Þ; qm:n ¼ k if m [ n
and qmqmþ1. . .qn otherwise (where q0 :¼ q0:0 :¼ kÞ:
Theorem proving requires an axiom scheme yielding an
enumerable set of axioms of a formal logic system A
whose formulas and theorems are symbol strings over some
finite alphabet that may include traditional symbols of logic
(such as !;^;¼; ð; Þ; 8; 9; . . .; c1; c2; . . .; f1; f2; . . .Þ; proba-
bility theory (such as EðÞ; the expectation operator),
arithmetics ðþ;; =;¼;P;\; . . .Þ; string manipulation (in
particular, symbols for representing any part of state s at
any time, such as s7:88ð5555Þ: A proof is a sequence of
theorems, each either an axiom or inferred from previous
theorems by applying one of the inference rules such as
modus ponens combined with unification, e.g., [13].
The remainder of this article will omit standard
knowledge to be found in any proof theory textbook.
Instead of listing all axioms of a particular A in a tedious
fashion, we will focus on the novel and critical details: how
to overcome potential problems with self-reference and
how to deal with the potentially delicate online generation
of proofs that talk about and affect the currently running
proof generator itself.
Proof Techniques
Brute force proof searchers (used in Hutter’s work [20, 21];
see section ‘‘Relations to previous work’’ for a review)
systematically generate all proofs in order of their sizes. In
order to produce a certain proof, this takes time exponential
in proof size. Instead our O()-optimal p(1) will produce
many proofs with low algorithmic complexity [26, 31, 70]
much more quickly. It systematically tests (see ‘‘Bias-
optimal proof search’’ section) programs called proof
techniques written in universal language L implemented
within p(1). For example, L may be a variant of PROLOG
[10] or the universal FORTH [34]—inspired programming
language used in recent work on optimal search [54]. A
proof technique is composed of instructions that allow any
part of s to be read, such as inputs encoded in variable x (a
substring of s) or the code of p(1). It may write on sp; a part
of s reserved for temporary results. It also may rewrite
switchprog, and produce an incrementally growing proof
placed in the string variable proof stored somewhere in s.
proof and sp are reset to the empty string at the beginning
of each new proof technique test. Apart from standard
arithmetic and function-defining instructions [54] that
modify sp; the programming language L includes special
instructions (for details see section ‘‘Important instructions
used by proof techniques’’) for prolonging the current proof
by correct theorems, for setting switchprog, and for
checking whether a provably optimal p-modifying program
was found and should be executed now. Certain long
proofs can be produced by short proof techniques.
Important Instructions Used by Proof Techniques
The nature of the six proof-modifying instructions below
(there are no others) makes it impossible to insert an
incorrect theorem into proof, thus trivializing proof veri-
fication. Let us first provide a brief overview of the most
important instructions: get-axiom(n) appends the nth pos-
sible axiom to the current proof, apply-rule(k, m, n)
applies the kth inference rule to the mth and nth theorem in
the current proof (appending the result), set-switch-
prog(m,n) sets switchprog :¼ spm:n; and check() tests
whether the last theorem in proof is a target theorem
180 Cogn Comput (2009) 1:177–193
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showing that a self-rewrite through switchprog would be
useful. The details are as follows.
1. get-axiom(n) takes as argument an integer n computed
by a prefix of the currently tested proof technique with
the help of arithmetic instructions such as those used in
previous work [54]. Then it appends the nth axiom (if
it exists, according to the axiom scheme below) as a
theorem to the current theorem sequence in proof. The
initial axiom scheme encodes:
(a) Hardware axioms describing the hardware, for-
mally specifying how certain components of s
(other than environmental inputs x) may change
from one cycle to the next. For example, if the
hardware is a TM2 [74], then s(t) is a bitstring
that encodes the current contents of all tapes of
the TM, the positions of its scanning heads, and
the current internal state of the TM’s finite state
automaton, while F specifies the TM’s look-up
table which maps any possible combination of
internal state and bits above scanning heads to a
new internal state and an action such as: replace
some head’s current bit by 1/0, increment (right
shift) or decrement (left shift) some scanning
head, read and copy next input bit to cell above
input tape’s scanning head, and so on.
Alternatively, if the hardware is given by the
abstract model of a modern microprocessor with
limited storage, s(t) will encode the current
storage contents, register values, instruction
pointers, and so on.
For instance, the following axiom could describe
how some 64-bit hardware’s instruction pointer
stored in s1:64 is continually incremented as long
as there is no overflow and the value of s65 does
not indicate that a jump to some other address
should take place:
ð8t8n : ½ðn\264  1Þ ^ ðn[0Þ ^ ðt[1Þ ^ ðt\TÞ
^ ðstring2numðs1:64ðtÞÞ ¼ nÞ ^ ðs65ðtÞ ¼ ‘0’Þ
! ðstring2numðs1:64ðtþ 1ÞÞ ¼ nþ 1ÞÞ
Here the semantics of used symbols such as ‘(’ and ‘ [’
and ‘?’ (implies) are the traditional ones, while ‘string2-
num’ symbolizes a function translating bitstrings into
numbers. It is clear that any abstract hardware model can
be fully axiomatized in a similar way.
(b) Reward axioms defining the computational costs
of any hardware instruction, and physical costs of
output actions, such as control signals y(t)
encoded in s(t). Related axioms assign values to
certain input events (encoded in variable x, a
substring of s) representing reward or punishment
(e.g., when a Go¨del machine-controlled robot
bumps into an obstacle). Additional axioms
define the total value of the Go¨del machine’s
life as a scalar-valued function of all rewards
(e.g., their sum) and costs experienced between
cycles 1 and T, and so on. For example, assume
that s17:18 can be changed only through external
inputs; the following example axiom says that the
total reward increases by 3 whenever such an
input equals ‘11’ (unexplained symbols carry the
obvious meaning):
ð8t18t2 : ½ðt1\t2Þ ^ ðt1  1Þ
^ ðt2  TÞ ^ ðs17:18ðt2Þ ¼ ‘11’Þ
! ½Rðt1; t2Þ ¼ Rðt1; t2  1Þ þ 3Þ;
where Rðt1; t2Þ is interpreted as the cumulative reward
between times t1 and t2: It is clear that any formal scheme
for producing rewards can be fully axiomatized in a similar
way.
(c) Environment axioms restricting the way the
environment will produce new inputs (encoded
within certain substrings of s) in reaction to
sequences of outputs y encoded in s. For example,
it may be known in advance that the environment
is sampled from an unknown probability distri-
bution l contained in a given set M of possible
distributions (compare Eq. 1). For example, M
may contain all distributions that are computable,
given the previous history [20, 70, 71 ], or at least
limit-computable [48, 50]. Or, more restrictively,
the environment may be some unknown but
deterministic computer program [46, 78] sampled
from the Speed Prior [51] which assigns low
probability to environments that are hard to
compute by any method. Or the interface to the
environment is Markovian [43], that is, the
current input always uniquely identifies the
environmental state—a lot of work has already
been done on this special case [4, 40, 73]. Even
more restrictively, the environment may evolve
in completely predictable fashion known in
advance. All such prior assumptions are perfectly
formalizable in an appropriate A (otherwise we
could not write scientific papers about them).
(d) Uncertainty axioms; string manipulation axioms.
Does the exact business of formal proof search
2 Turing reformulated Go¨del’s unprovability results in terms of TMs
[74] which subsequently became the most widely used abstract model
of computation. It is well known that there are universal TMs that in a
certain sense can emulate any other TM or any other known
computer. Go¨del’s integer-based formal language can be used to
describe any universal TM, and vice versa.
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really make sense in the uncertain real world?
Yes, it does. We just need to insert into p(1) the
standard axioms for representing uncertainty and
for dealing with probabilistic settings and
expected rewards, and so on. Compare the
definition of utility as an expected value in Eq.
1. Also note that the machine learning literature
is full of human-generated proofs of properties of
methods for dealing with stochastic environ-
ments.
Standard axioms for arithmetics and calculus and
probability theory [25] and statistics and string
manipulation (in conjunction with the hardware
axioms and environment axioms) allow for con-
structing proofs concerning (possibly uncertain)
properties of future values of s(t) as well as bounds
on expected remaining lifetime/costs/rewards,
given some time s and certain hypothetical values
for components of s(s), and so on. An example
theorem saying something about expected proper-
ties of future inputs x might look like this:
ð8t18l 2 M : ½ð1 t1Þ ^ ðt1 þ 15597\TÞ
^ ðs5:9ðt1Þ ¼ ‘01011’Þ
^ ðx40:44ðt1Þ ¼ ‘00000’Þ
! ð9t : ½ðt1\t\t1 þ 15597Þ
^ ðPlðx17:22ðtÞ ¼ ‘011011’ j sðt1ÞÞ
[
998
1000
ÞÞÞ;
where Plð:j:Þ represents a conditional probability with respect
to an axiomatized prior distribution l from a set of distribu-
tions M described by the environment axioms (Item (c)).
Given a particular formalizable hardware (Item (a)) and for-
malizable assumptions about the possibly probabilistic
environment (Item (c)), obviously one can fully axiomatize
everything that is needed for proof-based reasoning about past
and future machine states.
(e) Initial state axioms: Information about how to
reconstruct the initial state s(1) or parts thereof,
such that the proof searcher can build proofs
including axioms of the type
ðsm:nð1Þ ¼ zÞ; e.g. : ðs7:9ð1Þ ¼ ‘010’Þ:
Here and in the remainder of the article we use bold font in
formulas to indicate syntactic place holders (such as m,n,z)
for symbol strings representing variables (such as m,n,z)
whose semantics are explained in the text—in the present
context z is the bitstring sm:nð1Þ:
Note that it is no fundamental problem to fully encode both
the hardware description and the initial hardware-describ-
ing p within p itself. To see this, observe that some
software may include a program that can print the software.
(f) Utility axioms describing the overall goal in the
form of utility function u; e.g., Eq. 1 in ‘‘Set-up
and formal goal’’ section.
2. apply-rule(k, m, n) takes as arguments the index k (if
it exists) of an inference rule such as modus ponens
(stored in a list of possible inference rules encoded
within p(1)) and the indices m, n of two previously
proven theorems (numbered in order of their creation)
in the current proof. If applicable, the corresponding
inference rule is applied to the addressed theorems and
the resulting theorem appended to proof. Otherwise the
currently tested proof technique is interrupted. This
ensures that proof is never fed with invalid proofs.
3. delete-theorem(m) deletes the mth theorem in the
currently stored proof, thus freeing storage such that
proof-storing parts of s can be reused and the maximal
proof size is not necessarily limited by storage
constraints. Theorems deleted from proof, however,
cannot be addressed any more by apply-rule to
produce further prolongations of proof.
4. set-switchprog(m,n) replaces switchprog by spm:n;
provided that spm:n is indeed a non-empty substring of
sp, the storage writable by proof techniques.
5. check() verifies whether the goal of the proof search
has been reached. First it tests whether the last theorem
(if any) in proof has the form of a target theorem. A
target theorem states that given the current axioma-
tized utility function u (Eq. 1), the utility of a switch
from p to the current switchprog would be higher than
the utility of continuing the execution of p (which
would keep searching for alternative switchprogs).
Target theorems are symbol strings (encoded in s) of
the (decoded) form
ðu½sðt1Þ 	 ðswitchbitðt1Þ ¼ ‘1’Þ; Envðt1Þ[
ðu½sðt1Þ 	 ðswitchbitðt1Þ ¼ ‘0’Þ; Envðt1ÞÞ
ð2Þ
where the variable t1 (represented by syntactic place holder
t1Þ stands for a time step, while all other symbols belong to
the alphabet of the theorem-proving calculus, that is, the set
of possible target theorems is parameterized only by t1.
Here the calculus should permit the notation sðt1Þ 	
ðswitchbitðt1Þ ¼ ‘b’Þ as a shortcut for the state obtained
when we replace switchbit(t1), the true value of the variable
bit switchbit (encoded in s) at time t1, by b2f0; 1g: This
will facilitate the formulation of theorems that compare
values conditioned on various alternative hypothetical
properties of s(t1). (Note that s(t1) may be only partially
known by the current proof technique even in environ-
ments where s(t1) and switchbit(t1) are fully predetermined
for all valid t1.)
The purpose of introducing t1 is to deal with hardware-
specific temporal delays that may be involved in checking
182 Cogn Comput (2009) 1:177–193
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and switching—it may take a significant amount of time to
match abstract symbol strings found during proof search to
the Go¨del machine’s real current state. If a target theorem
has been found, check() uses a simple prewired subroutine
(also encoded in p(1), of course) to check whether there is
enough time left to set variable switchbit (originally 0) to 1
before the continually increasing time will equal t1. If this
subroutine returns a negative result, check() exits. Other-
wise it sets switchbit: = 1 (there is no other way of
changing switchbit). Then it repeatedly tests time until
time [ t1; to make sure the condition of formula (2) was
fulfilled at t1. Then it transfers control to switchprog (there
is no other way of calling switchprog). The switchprog may
subsequently rewrite all parts of s, excluding hardware-
reserved parts such as time and x, but including p.
6. state2theorem(m, n) takes two integer arguments m, n
and tries to transform the current contents of sm:n into a
theorem of the form
ðsm:nðt1Þ ¼ zÞ; e:g: : ðs6:9ð7775555Þ ¼ ‘1001’Þ;
where t1 represents a time measured (by checking time)
shortly after state2theorem was invoked, and z the bistring
sm:nðt1Þ (recall the special case t1 ¼ 1 of Item 5). So we
accept the time-labeled current observable contents of any
part of s as a theorem that does not have to be proven in an
alternative way from, say, the initial state s(1), because the
computation so far has already demonstrated that the the-
orem is true. Thus we may exploit information conveyed
by environmental inputs, and the fact that sometimes (but
not always) the fastest way to determine the output of a
program is to run it.
This non-traditional online interface between syntax and
semantics requires special care though. We must avoid
inconsistent results through parts of s that change while
being read. For example, the present value of a quickly
changing instruction pointer IP (continually updated by
the hardware) may be essentially unreadable in the sense
that the execution of the reading subroutine itself will
already modify IP many times. For convenience, the (typ-
ically limited) hardware could be set up such that it stores
the contents of fast hardware variables every c cycles in a
reserved part of s, such that an appropriate variant of
state2theorem() could at least translate certain recent
values of fast variables into theorems. This, however, will
not abolish al1 problems associated with self-observations.
For example, the sm:n to be read might also contain the
reading procedure’s own, temporary, constantly changing
string pointer variables, and so on.3 To address such
problems on computers with limited memory, state2theo-
rem first uses some fixed protocol (encoded in p(1), of
course) to check whether the current sm:n is readable at all
or whether it might change if it were read by the remaining
code of state2theorem. If so, or if m, n, are not in the proper
range, then the instruction has no further effect. Otherwise it
appends an observed theorem of the form ðsm:nðt1Þ ¼ zÞ to
proof. For example, if the current time is 7770000, then the
invocation of state2theorem(6,9) might return the theorem
ðs6:9ð7775555Þ ¼ ‘10010Þ; where 7775555  7770000 ¼
5555 reflects the time needed by state2theorem to perform
the initial check and to read leading bits off the continually
increasing time (reading time also costs time) such that it can
be sure that 7775555 is a recent proper time label following
the start of state2theorem.
The axiomatic system A is a defining parameter of a
given Go¨del machine. Clearly, A must be strong enough to
permit proofs of target theorems. In particular, the theory
of uncertainty axioms (Item (d)) must be sufficiently rich.
This is no fundamental problem: we simply insert all tra-
ditional axioms of probability theory [25].
Global Optimality Theorem
Intuitively, at any given time p should execute some self-
modification algorithm (via instruction check()—Item 5
above) only if it is the ‘best’ of all possible self-modifi-
cations, given the utility function, which typically depends
on available resources, such as storage size and remaining
lifetime. At first glance, however, target theorem (2) seems
to implicitly talk about just one single modification algo-
rithm, namely, switchprog(t1) as set by the systematic proof
searcher at time t1. Isn’t this type of local search greedy?
Couldn’t it lead to a local optimum instead of a global one?
No, it cannot, according to the following global optimality
theorem.
Globally Optimal Self-Changes, Given u
and A Encoded in p
Theorem 4.1 Given any formalizable utility function u
(Eq. 1), and assuming consistency of the underlying formal
system A; any self-change of p obtained through execution
of some program switchprog identified through the proof of
3 We see that certain parts of the current s may not be directly
observable without changing the observable itself. Sometimes,
however, axioms and previous observations will allow the Go¨del
machine to deduce time-dependent storage contents that are not
directly observable. For instance, by analyzing the code being
Footnote 3 continued
executed through instruction pointer IP in the example above, the
value of IP at certain times may be predictable (or postdictable, after
the fact). The values of other variables at given times, however, may
not be deducible at all. Such limits of self-observability are remi-
niscent of Heisenberg’s celebrated uncertainty principle [16], which
states that certain physical measurements are necessarily imprecise,
since the measuring process affects the measured quantity.
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a target theorem (2) is globally optimal in the following
sense: the utility of starting the execution of the present
switchprog is higher than the utility of waiting for the proof
searcher to produce an alternative switchprog later.
Proof Target theorem (2) implicitly talks about all the
other switchprogs that the proof searcher could produce in
the future. To see this, consider the two alternatives of the
binary decision: (1) either execute the current switchprog
(set switchbit = 1), or (2) keep searching for proofs and
switchprogs (set switchbit = 0) until the systematic
searcher comes up with an even better switchprog. Obvi-
ously the second alternative concerns all (possibly
infinitely many) potential switchprogs to be considered
later. That is, if the current switchprog were not the ‘best’,
then the proof searcher would not be able to prove that
setting switchbit and executing switchprog will cause
higher expected reward than discarding switchprog,
assuming consistency of A: Q.E.D.
In order to rephrase this a bit: the target theorem (2)
seems to refer only to the very first self-change, which may
completely rewrite the proof-search subroutine. What is it
that prevents later self-changes from being destructive?
Well, the first self-change will be executed only if it is
provably useful (in the sense of the present untility function
u) for all future self-changes (for which the present self-
change is setting the stage). This is actually one of the main
points of the whole self-referential set-up.
The initial proof searcher of section ‘‘Bias-optimal proof
search’’ already generates all possible proofs and switch-
progs in O()-optimal fashion. Nevertheless, since it is part
of p(1), its proofs can speak about the proof searcher itself,
possibly triggering proof searcher rewrites resulting in
better than merely O()-optimal performance.
Global Optimality and Recursive Meta-Levels
One of the most important aspects of our fully self-referential
set-up is the following. Any proof of a target theorem auto-
matically proves that the corresponding self-modification is
good for all further self-modifications affected by the present
one, in recursive fashion. In that sense all possible ‘‘meta-
levels‘‘ of the self-referential system are collapsed into one.
Rewriting the Utility Function
Can’t the Go¨del machine switch to a program switchprog
that rewrites the utility function to a ‘‘bogus’’ utility
function that makes unfounded promises of big rewards in
the near future? No, it cannot. It should be obvious that
rewrites of the utility function can happen only if the Go¨del
machine first can prove that the rewrite is useful according
to the present utility function.
Alternative Relaxed Target Theorem
We may replace the target theorem (2) by the following
alternative target theorem:
ðu½sðt1Þ 	 ðswitchbitðt1Þ ¼‘1’Þ; Envðt1Þ 
u½sðt1Þ 	 ðswitchbitðt1Þ ¼‘0’Þ; Envðt1ÞÞ
ð3Þ
The only difference to the original target theorem (2) is that
the ‘‘[‘‘ sign became a ‘‘C’’ sign. That is, the Go¨del
machine will change itself as soon as it has found a proof
that the change will not make things worse. A Global
optimality theorem similar to Theorem 4.1 holds; simply
replace the last phrase in Theorem 4.1 by: the utility of
starting the execution of the present switchprog is at least
as high as the utility of waiting for the proof searcher to
produce an alternative switchprog later.
How Difficult is it to Prove Target Theorems?
This depends on the tasks and the initial axioms A; of
course. It is straight-forward to devise simple tasks and
corresponding consistent A such that there are short and
trivial proofs of target theorems.
Even when we initialize the initial problem solver e(1)
by an asymptotically optimal, rather general method such
as Hutter’s AIXI(t,l) [20, 23], it may be straightforward to
prove that switching to another strategy is useful, espe-
cially when A contains additional prior knowledge in form
of axiomatic assumptions beyond those made by AIXI(t,l).
The latter needs a very time-consuming but constant set-up
phase whose costs disappear in the O()-notation but not in a
utility function such as the u of Eq. 1. For example, simply
construct an environment where maximal reward is
achieved by performing a never-ending sequence of simple
but rewarding actions, say, repeatedly pressing a lever, plus
a very simple axiomatic system A that permits a short
proof showing that it is useful to interrupt the non-
rewarding set-up phase and start pressing the lever.
On the other hand, it is possible to construct situations
where it is impossible to prove target theorems, for exam-
ple, by using results of undecidability theory, e.g., [5, 6, 14,
38]. In particular, adopting the extreme notion of triviality
embodied by Rice’s theorem [38] (any nontrivial property
over general functions is undecidable), only trivial
improvements of a given strategy may be provably useful.
This notion of triviality, however, clearly does not reflect
what is intuitively regarded as trivial by scientists. Although
many theorems of the machine learning literature in par-
ticular, and the computer science literature in general, are
limited to functional properties that are trivial in the sense
of Rice, they are widely regarded as non-trivial in an intu-
itive sense. In fact, the infinite domains of function classes
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addressed by Rice’s theorem are irrelevant not only for
most scientists dealing with real world problems but also for
a typical Go¨del machine dealing with a limited number of
events that may occur within its limited life time. In general,
in between the obviously trivial and the obviously non-
trivial cases there are many less obvious ones. The point is:
usually we do not know in advance whether it is possible or
not to change a given initial problem solver in a provably
good way. The traditional approach is to invest human
research effort into finding out. A Go¨del machine, however,
can do this by itself, without essential limits apart from
those of computability and provability.
Note that to prove a target theorem, a proof technique does
not necessarily have to compute the true expected utilities of
switching and not switching—it just needs to determine
which is higher. For example, it may be easy to prove that
speeding up a subroutine of the proof searcher by a factor of 2
will certainly be worth the negligible (compared to lifetime
T) time needed to execute the subroutine-changing algo-
rithm, no matter what is the precise utility of the switch.
What About Non-Computable Environments?
The Go¨del machine software can produce only computable
mappings from input sequences to output sequences. What
if the environment is non-computable? Many physicists
and other scientists (exceptions: [46, 48, 59, 61, 77, 78])
actually seem to assume the real world makes use of all the
real numbers, most of which are incomputable. Neverthe-
less, theorems and proofs are just finite symbol strings, and
all treatises of physics contain only computable axioms and
theorems, even when some of the theorems can be inter-
preted as making statements about uncountably many
objects, such as all the real numbers. (Note though that the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem [32, 68] implies that any
first-order theory with an uncountable model such as the
real numbers also has a countable model.) In general,
formal descriptions of non-computable objects do not at all
present a fundamental problem—they may still allow for
finding a strategy that provably maximizes utility. If so, a
Go¨del machine can exploit this. If not, then humans will
not have a fundamental advantage over Go¨del machines.
Bias-Optimal Proof Search
Here we construct an initial p(1) that is O()-optimal in a
certain limited sense to be described below, but still might be
improved as it is not necessarily optimal in the sense of the
given u (for example, the u of Eq. 1 neither mentions nor
cares for O()-optimality). Our bias-optimal proof search
(BIOPS) is essentially an application of Universal Search
[28, 30] to proof search. One novelty, however, is this:
previous practical variants and extensions of Universal
Search have been applied [45, 47, 54, 64] to offline program
search tasks where the program inputs are fixed such that the
same program always produces the same results. In our
online setting, however, BIOPS has to take into account that
the same proof technique started at different times may yield
different proofs, as it may read parts of s (e.g., inputs) that
change as the machine’s life proceeds.
Online Universal Search in Proof Space
BIOPS starts with a probability distribution P (the initial
bias) on the proof techniques w that one can write in L;
e.g., PðwÞ ¼ KlðwÞ for programs composed from K pos-
sible instructions [30]. BIOPS is near-bias-optimal [54] in
the sense that it will not spend much more time on any
proof technique than it deserves, according to its probabi-
listic bias, namely, not much more than its probability
times the total search time:
Definition 5.1 (bias-optimal searchers [54]) Let R be a
problem class, C be a search space of solution candidates
(where any problem r 2 R should have a solution in CÞ;
Pðq j rÞ be a task-dependent bias in the form of conditional
probability distributions on the candidates q 2 C: Suppose
that we also have a predefined procedure that creates and
tests any given q on any r 2 R within time t(q,r) (typically
unknown in advance). Then a searcher is n-bias-optimal
ðn 1Þ if for any maximal total search time Ttotal [ 0 it is
guaranteed to solve any problem r 2 R if it has a solution
p 2 C satisfying tðp; rÞPðp j rÞTtotal=n: It is bias-optimal
if n = 1.
Method 5.1 (BIOPS) In phase ði ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .Þ DO: FOR
all self-delimiting [30] proof techniques w 2 L satisfying
PðwÞ 2i DO:
1. Run w until halt or error (such as division by zero) or
2iPðwÞ steps consumed.
2. Undo effects of w on sp (does not cost significantly
more time than executing w).
A proof technique w can interrupt Method 5.1 only by
invoking instruction check() (Item 5), which may
transfer control to switchprog (which possibly even
will delete or rewrite Method 5.1). Since the initial p
runs on the formalized hardware, and since proof
techniques tested by p can read p and other parts of s,
they can produce proofs concerning the (expected)
performance of p and BIOPS itself. Method 5.1 at least
has the optimal order of computational complexity in
the following sense.
Theorem 5.1 If independently of variable time(s) some
unknown fast proof technique w would require at most f(k)
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steps to produce a proof of difficulty measure k (an integer
depending on the nature of the task to be solved), then
Method 5.1 will need at most O(f(k)) steps.
Proof It is easy to see that Method 5.1 will need at most
O(f(k)/P(w)) = O(f(k)) steps—the constant factor 1/P(w)
does not depend on k. Q.E.D.
The initial proof search itself is merely O()-optimal.
Note again, however, that the proofs themselves may
concern quite different, arbitrary formalizable notions of
optimality (stronger than those expressible in the O()-
notation) embodied by the given, problem-specific, for-
malized utility function u, in particular, the maximum
future reward in the sense of Eq. 1. This may provoke
useful, constant-affecting rewrites of the initial proof
searcher despite its limited (yet popular and widely used)
notion of O()-optimality. Once a useful rewrite has been
found and executed after some initial fraction of the Go¨del
machine ’s total lifetime, the restrictions of O()-optimality
need not be an issue any more.
How a Surviving Proof Searcher may Use the Optimal
Ordered Problem Solver to Solve Remaining Proof
Search Tasks
The following is not essential for this article. Let us assume
that the execution of the switchprog corresponding to the first
found target theorem has not rewritten the code of p itself—
the current p is still equal to p(1)—and has reset switchbit and
returned control to p such that it can continue where it was
interrupted. In that case the BIOPS subroutine of p(1) can use
the Optimal Ordered Problem Solver (OOPS) [54] to accel-
erate the search for the nth target theorem (n [ 1) by reusing
proof techniques for earlier found target theorems where
possible. The basic ideas are as follows (details: [54]).
Whenever a target theorem has been proven, p(1) free-
zes the corresponding proof technique: it becomes non-
writable by proof techniques to be tested in later proof
search tasks, but remains readable, such that it can be copy
edited and/or invoked as a subprogram by future proof
techniques. We also allow prefixes of proof techniques to
temporarily rewrite the probability distribution on their
suffixes [54], thus essentially rewriting the probability-
based search procedure (an incremental extension of
Method 5.1) based on previous experience. As a side effect
we metasearch for faster search procedures, which can
greatly accelerate the learning of new tasks [54].
Given a new proof search task, BIOPS performs OOPS by
spending half the total search time on a variant of Method
5.1 that searches only among self-delimiting [9, 29] proof
techniques starting with the most recently frozen proof
technique. The rest of the time is spent on fresh proof
techniques with arbitrary prefixes (which may reuse
previously frozen proof techniques though) [54]. (We
could also search for a generalizing proof technique solv-
ing all proof search tasks so far. In the first half of the
search we would not have to test proof techniques on tasks
other than the most recent one, since we already know that
their prefixes solve the previous tasks [54].)
It can be shown that OOPS is essentially 8-bias-optimal
(see Definition 5.1) given either the initial bias or inter-
mediate biases due to frozen solutions to previous tasks
[54]. This result immediately carries over to BIOPS. In order
to summarize, BIOPS essentially allocates part of the total
search time for a new task to proof techniques that exploit
previous successful proof techniques in computable ways.
If the new task can be solved faster by copy editing/
invoking previously frozen proof techniques than by
solving the new proof search task from scratch, then BIOPS
will discover this and profit thereof. If not, then at least it
will not be significantly slowed down by the previous
solutions—BIOPS will remain 8-bias-optimal.
Recall, however, that BIOPS is not the only possible way
of initializing the Go¨del machine’s proof searcher. The
global optimality Theorem 4.1 (see ‘‘Global optimality
theorem’’ section) expresses optimality with respect to
whichever initial proof searcher we choose.
Discussion and Previous Work
Here we list a few examples of possible types of self-
improvements, Go¨del machine applicability to various
tasks defined by various utility functions and environments,
probabilistic hardware, and relations to previous work. We
also briefly discuss self-reference and consciousness.
Possible Types of Go¨del Machine Self-Improvements
Which provably useful self-modifications are possible?
There are few limits to what a Go¨del machine might do.
1. In one of the simplest cases it might leave its basic
proof searcher intact and just change the ratio of time-
sharing between the proof searching subroutine and the
subpolicy e—those parts of p responsible for interac-
tion with the environment.
2. Or the Go¨del machine might modify e only. For
example, the initial e(1) may be a program that regularly
stores limited memories of past events somewhere in s;
this might allow p to derive that it would be useful to
modify e such that e will conduct certain experiments to
increase the knowledge about the environment, and use
the resulting information to increase reward intake. In
this sense the Go¨del machine embodies a principled
way of dealing with the exploration versus exploitation
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problem [24]. Note that the expected utility (Eq. 1) of
conducting some experiment may exceed the one of not
conducting it, even when the experimental outcome
later suggests to keep acting in line with the previous e.
3. The Go¨del machine might also modify its very axioms to
speed things up, provided this is provably useful accord-
ing to the old axioms. For example, it might find a proof
that the original axioms should be replaced or augmented
by theorems derivable from the original axioms.
4. The Go¨del machine might even change its own utility
function and target theorem, but can do so only if their
new values are provably better according to the old
ones.
5. In many cases we do not expect the Go¨del machine to
replace its proof searcher by code that completely
abandons the search for proofs. Instead we expect that
only certain subroutines of the proof searcher will be
sped up—compare the example in section ‘‘How
difficult is it to prove target theorems?’’—or that
perhaps just the order of generated proofs will be
modified in problem-specific fashion. This could be
done by modifying the probability distribution on the
proof techniques of the initial bias-optimal proof
searcher from the ‘‘Bias-optimal proof search’’ section.
6. In general, the utility of limited rewrites may often be
easier to prove than the one of total rewrites. For
example, suppose it is 8.00 pm and our Go¨del
machine-controlled agent’s permanent goal is to
maximize future expected reward, using the (alterna-
tive) target theorem (3). Part thereof is to avoid
hunger. There is nothing in its fridge, and shops close
down at 8.30 pm. It does not have time to optimize its
way to the supermarket in every little detail, but if it
does not get going right now it will stay hungry tonight
(in principle such near-future consequences of actions
should be easily provable, possibly even in a way
related to how humans prove advantages of potential
actions to themselves). That is, if the agent’s previous
policy did not already include, say, an automatic daily
evening trip to the supermarket, the policy provably
should be rewritten at least in a very limited and
simple way right now, while there is still time, such
that the agent will surely get some food tonight,
without affecting less urgent future behavior that can
be optimized/decided later, such as details of the route
to the food, or of tomorrow’s actions.
7. In certain uninteresting environments reward is max-
imized by becoming dumb. For example, a given task
may require to repeatedly and forever execute the
same pleasure center-activating action, as quickly as
possible. In such cases the Go¨del machine may delete
most of its more time-consuming initial software
including the proof searcher.
8. Note that there is no reason why a Go¨del machine
should not augment its own hardware. Suppose its
lifetime is known to be 100 years. Given a hard
problem and axioms restricting the possible behaviors
of the environment, the Go¨del machine might find a
proof that its expected cumulative reward will increase
if it invests 10 years into building faster computational
hardware, by exploiting the physical resources of its
environment.
Example Applications
Traditional examples that do not involve significant inter-
action with a probabilistic environment are easily dealt
with in our reward-based framework:
Example 6.1 (Time-limited NP-hard optimization) The
initial input to the Go¨del machine is the representation of a
connected graph with a large number of nodes linked by
edges of various lengths. Within given time T it should find
a cyclic path connecting all nodes. The only real-valued
reward will occur at time T. It equals 1 divided by the
length of the best path found so far (0 if none was found).
There are no other inputs. The by-product of maximizing
expected reward is to find the shortest path findable within
the limited time, given the initial bias.
Example 6.2 (Fast theorem proving) Prove or disprove as
quickly as possible that all even integers[2 are the sum of
two primes (Goldbach’s conjecture). The reward is 1/t,
where t is the time required to produce and verify the first
such proof.
More general cases are as follows.
Example 6.3 (Maximizing expected reward with bounded
resources) A cognitive robot that needs at least 1 l of
gasoline per hour interacts with a partially unknown
environment, trying to find hidden, limited gasoline depots
to occasionally refuel its tank. It is rewarded in proportion
to its lifetime, and dies after at most 100 years or as soon as
its tank is empty or it falls off a cliff, and so on. The
probabilistic environmental reactions are initially unknown
but assumed to be sampled from the axiomatized Speed
Prior [51], according to which hard-to-compute environ-
mental reactions are unlikely. This permits a computable
strategy for making near-optimal predictions [51]. One by-
product of maximizing expected reward is to maximize
expected lifetime.
Example 6.4 (Optimize any suboptimal problem solver)
Given any formalizable problem, implement a suboptimal
but known problem solver as software on the Go¨del
machine hardware, and let the proof searcher of ‘‘Bias-
optimal proof search’’ section run in parallel.
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Probabilistic Go¨del Machine Hardware
Above we have focused on an example deterministic
machine living in a possibly probabilistic environment. It is
straightforward to extend this to computers whose actions
are computed in probabilistic fashion, given the current
state. Then the expectation calculus used for probabilistic
aspects of the environment simply has to be extended to the
hardware itself, and the mechanism for verifying proofs has
to take into account that there is no such thing as a certain
theorem—at best there are formal statements which are
true with such and such probability. In fact, this may be the
most realistic approach as any physical hardware is error-
prone, which should be taken into account by realistic
probabilistic Go¨del machines.
Probabilistic settings also automatically avoid certain
issues of axiomatic consistency. For example, predictions
proven to come true with probability less than 1.0 do not
necessarily cause contradictions even when they do not
match the observations.
Relations to Previous Work
Despite (or maybe because of) the ambitiousness and
potential power of self-improving machines, there has been
little work in this vein outside our own labs at IDSIA and
TU Mu¨nchen. Here we will list essential differences
between the Go¨del machine and our previous approaches to
‘learning to learn,’ ‘metalearning,’ self-improvement, self-
optimization, and so on.
The most closely related approaches are Hutter’s
HSEARCH and AIXI(t,l). For historical reasons, however, we
will first discuss Levin’s Universal Search and Hutter’s
AIXI.
Go¨del Machine Versus Universal Search
Unlike the fully self-referential Go¨del machine, Levin’s
Universal Search [28, 30] has a hardwired, unmodifiable
meta-algorithm that cannot improve itself. It is asymptot-
ically optimal for inversion problems whose solutions can
be quickly verified in O(n) time (where n is the solution
size), but it will always suffer from the same huge constant
slowdown factors (typically 
 101000Þ buried in the O()-
notation. The self-improvements of a Go¨del machine,
however, can be more than merely O()-optimal, since its
utility function may formalize a stonger type of optimality
that does not ignore huge constants just because they are
constant—compare the utility function of Eq. 1.
Furthermore, the Go¨del machine is applicable to general
lifelong RL tasks [24] where Universal Search is not
asymptotically optimal, and not even applicable, since in
RL the evaluation of some behavior’s value in principle
consumes the learner’s entire life! So the naive test of
whether a program is good or not would consume the entire
life. That is, we could test only one program; afterwards
life would be over.
Therefore, to achieve their objective, general RL
machines must do things that Universal Search does not
do, such as predicting future tasks and rewards. This partly
motivates Hutter’s universal RL machine AIXI, to be dis-
cussed next.
Go¨del Machine Versus AIXI
Unlike Go¨del machines, Hutter’s recent AIXI model [20,
23] generally needs unlimited computational resources per
input update. It combines Solomonoff’s universal predic-
tion scheme [70, 71] with an expectimax computation. In
discrete cycle k ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .; action y(k) results in per-
ception x(k) and reward r(k), both sampled from the
unknown (reactive) environmental probability distribu-
tion l. AIXI defines a mixture distribution n as a weighted
sum of distributions m 2 M; where M is any class of
distributions that includes the true environment l. For
example, M may be a sum of all computable distributions
[70, 71], where the sum of the weights does not exceed 1.
In cycle k ? 1, AIXI selects as next action the first in an
action sequence maximizing n-predicted reward up to some
given horizon. Recent work [22] demonstrated AIXI’s
optimal use of observations as follows. The Bayes-optimal
policy pn based on the mixture n is self-optimizing in the
sense that its average utility value converges asymptoti-
cally for all l 2 M to the optimal value achieved by the
(infeasible) Bayes-optimal policy pl which knows l in
advance. The necessary condition that M admits self-
optimizing policies is also sufficient. Furthermore, pn is
Pareto-optimal in the sense that there is no other policy
yielding higher or equal value in all environments m 2 M
and a strictly higher value in at least one [22].
While AIXI clarifies certain theoretical limits of machine
learning, it is computationally intractable, especially when
M includes all computable distributions. This drawback
motivated work on the time-bounded, asymptotically
optimal AIXI(t,l) system [20] and the related HSEARCH [21],
both to be discussed next.
Go¨del Machine Versus HSEARCH and AIXI(t,l)
Now we come to the most closely related previous work; so
we will go an extra length to point out the main novelties of
the Go¨del machine.
Hutter’s non-self-referential but still O()-optimal ‘fast-
est’ algorithm for all well-defined problems HSEARCH [21]
uses a hardwired brute force proof searcher and ignores
the costs of proof search. Assume discrete input/output
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domains X/Y, a formal problem specification f : X!Y (say,
a functional description of how integers are decomposed
into their prime factors), and a particular x [X (say, an
integer to be factorized). HSEARCH orders all proofs of an
appropriate axiomatic system by size to find programs q
that for all z2X provably compute f(z) within time bound
tq(z). Simultaneously it spends most of its time on exe-
cuting the q with the best currently proven time bound
tq(x). It turns out that HSEARCH is as fast as the fastest
algorithm that provably computes f(z) for all z [X, save for
a constant factor smaller than 1 ? e (arbitrary e[ 0) and
an f-specific but x-independent additive constant [21]. This
constant may be enormous though.
Hutter’s AIXI(t,l) [20] is related. In discrete cycle k ¼
1; 2; 3; . . . of AIXI(t,l)’s lifetime, action y(k) results in per-
ception x(k) and reward r(k), where all quantities may
depend on the complete history. Using a universal com-
puter such as a TM, AIXI(t,l) needs an initial offline setup
phase (prior to interaction with the environment) where it
uses a hardwired brute force proof searcher to examine all
proofs of length at most L, filtering out those that identify
programs (of maximal size l and maximal runtime t per
cycle) which not only could interact with the environment
but which for all possible interaction histories also cor-
rectly predict a lower bound of their own expected future
reward. In cycle k, AIXI(t,l) then runs all programs identi-
fied in the setup phase (at most 2l), finds the one with
highest self-rating, and executes its corresponding action.
The problem-independent setup time (where almost all of
the work is done) is OðL2LÞ: The online time per cycle is
Oðt2lÞ: Both are constant but typically huge.
Advantages and Novelty of the Go¨del Machine. There
are major differences between the Go¨del machine and
Hutter’s HSEARCH [21] and AIXI(t,l) [20], including the
following.
(a) The theorem provers of HSEARCH and AIXI(t,l) are
hardwired, non-self-referential, unmodifiable meta-
algorithms that cannot improve themselves. That is,
they will always suffer from the same huge constant
slowdowns (typically 
 101000) buried in the O()-
notation. But there is nothing in principle that prevents
the truly self-referential code of a Go¨del machine from
proving and exploiting drastic reductions of such
constants, in the best possible way that provably
constitutes an improvement, if there is any.
(b) The demonstration of the O()-optimality of HSEARCH
and AIXI(t,l) depends on a clever allocation of
computation time to some of their unmodifiable
meta-algorithms. Our global optimality theorem
(Theorem 4.1, ‘‘Global optimality theorem’’ section),
however, is justified through a quite different type of
reasoning which indeed exploits and crucially
depends on the fact that there is no unmodifiable
software at all, and that the proof searcher itself is
readable, modifiable, and can be improved. This is
also the reason why its self-improvements can be
more than merely O()-optimal.
(c) HSEARCH uses a ‘‘trick‘‘ of proving more than is
necessary which also disappears in the sometimes
quite misleading O()-notation: it wastes time on
finding programs that provably compute f(z) for all
z2X even when the current f ðxÞðx 2 XÞ is the only
object of interest. A Go¨del machine, however, needs
to prove only what is relevant to its goal formalized
by u. For example, the general u of Eq. 1 completely
ignores the limited concept of O()-optimality, but
instead formalizes a stronger type of optimality that
does not ignore huge constants just because they are
constant.
(d) Both the Go¨del machine and AIXI(t,l) can maximize
expected reward (HSEARCH cannot). But the Go¨del
machine is more flexible as we may plug in any type
of formalizable utility function (e.g., worst case
reward), and unlike AIXI(t,l) it does not require an
enumerable environmental distribution.
Nevertheless, we may use AIXI(t,l) or HSEARCH or other
less general methods to initialize the substring e of p which
is responsible for interaction with the environment. The
Go¨del machine will replace e(1) as soon as it finds a
provably better strategy.
It is the self-referential aspects of the Go¨del machine
that relieve us of much of the burden of careful algorithm
design required for AIXI(t,l) and HSEARCH. They make the
Go¨del machine both conceptually simpler and more
general.
Go¨del Machine Versus OOPS
The OOPS [52, 54] (used by BIOPS in the section ‘‘How a
surviving proof searcher may use the optimal ordered
problem solver to solve remaining proof search tasks’’)
extends Universal Search. It is a bias-optimal (see Defi-
nition 5.1) way of searching for a program that solves each
problem in an ordered sequence of problems of a rather
general type, continually organizing and managing and
reusing earlier acquired knowledge. Solomonoff recently
also proposed related ideas for a scientist’s assistant [72]
that modifies the probability distribution of Universal
Search [28] based on experience.
Like Universal Search, OOPS is not directly applicable to
RL problems. A provably optimal RL machine must
somehow prove properties of otherwise un-testable
behaviors (such as: what is the expected reward of this
behavior which one cannot naively test as there is not
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enough time). That is part of what the Go¨del machine does:
it tries to greatly cut testing time, replacing naive time-
consuming tests by much faster proofs of predictable test
outcomes whenever this is possible.
Proof verification itself can be performed very quickly.
In particular, verifying the correctness of a found proof
typically does not consume the remaining life. Hence the
Go¨del machine may use OOPS as a bias-optimal proof-
searching submodule (see section ‘‘How a surviving proof
searcher may use the optimal ordered problem solver to
solve remaining proof search tasks’’). Since the proofs
themselves may concern quite different, arbitrary notions
of optimality (not just bias-optimality), the Go¨del machine
is more general than plain OOPS. But it is not just an
extension of OOPS. Instead of OOPS it may as well use non-
bias-optimal alternative methods to initialize its proof
searcher. On the other hand, OOPS is not just a precursor of
the Go¨del machine. It is a stand-alone, incremental, bias-
optimal way of allocating runtime to programs that reuse
previously successful programs, and is applicable to many
traditional problems, including but not limited to proof
search.
Go¨del Machine Versus Success-Story Algorithm and Other
Metalearners
A learner’s modifiable components are called its policy. An
algorithm that modifies the policy is a learning algorithm. If
the learning algorithm has modifiable components repre-
sented as part of the policy, then we speak of a self-modifying
policy (SMP) [63]. SMPs can modify the way they modify
themselves, and so on. The Go¨del machine has an SMP.
In previous practical work we used the success-story
algorithm (SSA) to force some (stochastic) SMP to trigger
better and better self-modifications [49, 63, 64]. During the
learner’s life-time, SSA is occasionally called at times
computed according to SMP itself. SSA uses backtracking
to undo those SMP-generated SMP-modifications that have
not been empirically observed to trigger lifelong reward
accelerations (measured up until the current SSA call—this
evaluates the long-term effects of SMP-modifications set-
ting the stage for later SMP-modifications). SMP-
modifications that survive SSA represent a lifelong success
history. Until the next SSA call, they build the basis for
additional SMP-modifications. Solely by self-modifications
our SMP/SSA-based learners solved a complex task in a
partially observable environment whose state space is far
bigger than most found in the literature [63].
The Go¨del machine’s training algorithm is theoretically
much more powerful than SSA though. SSA empirically
measures the usefulness of previous self-modifications, and
does not necessarily encourage provably optimal ones.
Similar drawbacks hold for Lenat’s human-assisted, non-
autonomous, self-modifying learner [27], our Meta-Genetic
Programming [41] extending Cramer’s Genetic Program-
ming [3, 11], our metalearning economies [41] extending
Holland’s machine learning economies [19], and gradient-
based metalearners for continuous program spaces of dif-
ferentiable RNNs [17, 44]. All these methods, however,
could be used to seed p(1) with an initial policy.
Go¨del Machines and Consciousness
In recent years the topic of self-reference and consciousness
in cognitive systems has gained some credibility as a serious
research issue, at least in philosophy and neuroscience, e.g.,
[1, 2, 7, 12, 15, 66, 69]. However, there has been a lack of
technical justifications of consciousness: so far nobody has
shown that self-reference and consciousness are provably
useful for solving problems, although problem solving is
considered of central importance in philosophy [37].
In a certain sense, the fully self-referential Go¨del machine
may be viewed as providing just such a technical justification
[56]. It may be called ‘‘conscious’’ or ‘‘self-aware’’ in the
sense that its entire behavior is open to self-introspection,
and modifiable. It may ‘step outside of itself’ [18] by exe-
cuting self-changes that are provably good, where the proof
searcher itself is subject to analysis and change through the
proof techniques it tests. And this type of total self-reference
is precisely the reason for its optimality as a problem solver,
in the sense of Theorem 4.1.
No Free Lunch?
Don’t the ‘‘no free lunch theorems’’ [76] say that it is
impossible to construct universal problem solvers? No,
they do not. They refer to the very special case of problems
sampled from i.i.d. uniform distributions on finite problem
spaces. See the discussion of no free lunch theorems in an
earlier paper [54].
Summary
In 1931, Kurt Go¨del laid the foundations of theoretical
computer science, using elementary arithmetics to build a
universal programming language for encoding arbitrary
proofs, given an arbitrary enumerable set of axioms. He
went on to construct self-referential formal statements that
claim their own unprovability, using Cantor’s diagonal-
ization trick [8] to demonstrate that formal systems such as
traditional mathematics are either flawed in a certain sense
or contain unprovable but true statements [14]. Since
Go¨del’s exhibition of the fundamental limits of proof and
computation, and Konrad Zuse’s subsequent construction
of the first working programmable computer (1935–1941),
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there has been a lot of work on specialized algorithms
solving problems taken from more or less general problem
classes. Apparently, however, one remarkable fact has until
recently escaped the attention of computer scientists: it is
possible to use self-referential proof systems to build
optimally efficient yet conceptually very simple universal
problem solvers—ultimate cognitive agents.
The initial software p(1) of our Go¨del machine runs an
initial, typically sub-optimal problem solver, e.g., one of
Hutter’s approaches [20, 21] which have at least an optimal
order of complexity, or some less general method [24].
Simultaneously, it runs an O()-optimal initial proof searcher
using an online variant of Universal Search to test proof
techniques, which are programs able to compute proofs
concerning the system’s own future performance, based on
an axiomatic system A encoded in p(1), describing a formal
utility function u, the hardware and p(1) itself. If there is no
provably good, globally optimal way of rewriting p(1) at all,
then humans will not find one either. But if there is one, then
p(1) itself can find and exploit it. This approach yields the
first class of theoretically sound, fully self-referential, opti-
mally efficient, general, problem solving cognitive systems.
Although current theorem proving computers have just a
fraction of the raw computational power of a human brain
and cannot yet prove non-trivial theorems in reasonable
time without human intervention at crucial decision points,
more and more important mathematical proofs (four color
theorem, etc.) heavily depend on automated proof search.
And traditional theorem provers do not even make use of
our novel notions of proof techniques and O()-optimal
BIOPS. Of course, some proofs are indeed hard to find, but
here humans and Go¨del machines face the same funda-
mental limitations.
After the theoretical discussion from ‘‘Introduction and
outline’’ to ‘‘Bias-optimal proof search’’ sections, one
practical question remains: to build a particular, especially
practical Go¨del machine with small initial constant over-
head, which generally useful theorems should one add as
axioms to A (as initial bias) such that the initial searcher
does not have to prove them from scratch? If our cognitive
agent can execute only a fixed number of computational
instructions per unit time interval (say, 10 trillion ele-
mentary operations per second), what is the best way of
using them in the initial phase of his Go¨del machine, before
the first self-rewrite?
Concluding Remarks: General AI and Cognitive
Computation Becoming a Formal Science
There are at least two convincing ways of doing cognitive
systems research: (1) construct a (possibly heuristic)
machine or algorithm that somehow (it does not really
matter how) solves a previously unsolved interesting and
cognitively challenging problem, such as beating the best
human player of Go (success will outshine any lack of
theory). Or (2) prove that a particular novel algorithm is
optimal for an important class of AI problems.
It is the nature of heuristics (case (1)) that they lack
staying power, as they may soon get replaced by next
year’s even better heuristics. Theorems (case (2)), how-
ever, are for eternity. That’s why formal sciences prefer
theorems.
For example, after a heuristics-dominated initial phase,
probability theory became a formal science centuries ago,
and totally formal in 1933 with Kolmogorov’s axioms [25],
shortly after Go¨del’s paper [14]. Old but provably optimal
techniques of probability theory are still in every day’s use,
and in fact highly significant for modern AI, while many
initially successful heuristic approaches eventually became
unfashionable, of interest mainly to the historians of the
field.
Similarly, the first 50 years of attempts at ‘‘general AI’’
and ‘‘general cognitive computation’’ have been dominated
by heuristic approaches, e.g., [33, 35, 39, 75]. Traditionally
many theoretical computer scientists have regarded the
field with contempt for its lack of hard theoretical results.
In recent years things have changed, however. As discussed
in this article, the new millennium brought the first math-
ematically sound, asymptotically optimal, universal
problem solvers, providing a new, rigorous foundation for
the previously largely heuristic field of General AI and
embedded cognitive agents, identifying the limits of both
human and artificial intelligence, and providing a yardstick
for any future approach to general cognitive systems [58,
60, 62]. The field is becoming a real formal science!
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